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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 
Upstream – Federal  
 
9th Cir.  
Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 908 F.3d 437 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 
The surface estate and one-third of the mineral estate of a ranch in Montana 
was sold to Current Owner, while two-thirds of the mineral estate was 
retained by Previous Owners. Dinosaur fossils were found on the ranch’s 
property, and the two parties disputed over who owned the fossils and 
whether the fossils were minerals or not. Current Owner sought a 
declaratory judgment that they own the fossils as owners of the surface 
estate, while Previous Owners removed the case to federal court and sought 
their own declaratory judgment that the fossils were part of the mineral 
estate and that Previous Owners owned two-thirds of the fossils. The 
district court granted summary judgment to Current Owner, stating that the 
fossils were not minerals under Montana law. Previous Owners appealed. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first refuted the district court’s 
definition of mineral as requiring something to be mined and refined, which 
excluded the fossils. Instead, the court found that the dinosaur fossils were 
minerals in the sense that, like coal or oil, they were composed of once 
living beings, and the fossils fit the more generic word “use” in the sense 
that they are displayed and viewed in museums. The court next found that 
the Montana Supreme Court used the Heinatz test to determine if something 
is a mineral, whether it fits the scientific definition of mineral, and whether 
it has a special quality to make it valuable. The court rejected Current 
Owner’s argument that this non-categorical test is too confusing. The court 
applied this test to the fossils and found that the fossils were scientifically 
minerals and had special value. The court held that the fossils were 
minerals and thus part of the mineral estate. As such, the court reversed 
the decision of the lower court. 
 
Solenex LLC v. Jewell, 334 F. Supp. 3d 174 (D.D.C. 2018).  
 
Lessee sued several federal agencies and officers (“Agencies”) for 
cancelling its oil and gas lease in violation of the APA, seeking injunctive 
and declaratory relief. The lease, originally approved in 1982 by the Bureau 
of Land Management (“BLM”), was suspended in 1993 to conduct 
additional environmental assessments, but was then suspended each year 
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after for approximately 20 years. After litigation and a court order to submit 
a revised schedule, Agencies cancelled the lease, asserting that the original 
lease violated the NEPA and the NHPA. In the present case, Lessee alleged 
that: (1) the cancellation was arbitrary and capricious; (2) the cancellation 
fell outside the statute of limitations; (3) Agencies should be estopped from 
cancelling the lease; and (4) the lease was properly issued in compliance 
with the NEPA and NHPA. The court found that Agencies acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously by: (1) giving no notice of the cancellation; (2) not 
considering Lessee’s reliance interests; and (3) waiting 33 years to correct 
an agency error which was easily discoverable. In finding the Agency’s 
actions to be arbitrary and capricious, the court found no need to address 
the remaining issues and granted Lessee’s motion for summary judgment. 
 
Upstream – State  
 
Louisiana 
Gilmer v. Principle Energy, L.L.C., 52,218 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/18); 256 
So. 3d 1139.  
 
On April 1, 2008, Landowner executed a royalty conveyance to Operator, 
which had a prescriptive period of three years, with a clause stating that a 
shut-in well would perpetuate the term of the deed. Within a year, a well 
was completed on Landowner’s property, but was never placed in 
production as it was awaiting pipeline. The well was classified as a shut-in 
well by the state regulatory agency. In May 2009, the state agency created a 
unit and designated the well as the unit well. A new well was completed on 
April 30, 2011, which was then authorized to be the unit well and produced 
in paying quantities. Landowner sued, arguing that the prescription had 
accrued and sought a release from the royalty conveyance. The trial court 
granted summary judgement in favor of Operator. Here, the court affirmed 
the trial court’s decision. Citing precedent holding that the existence of a 
completed, shut-in well on a validly created unit is enough to interrupt a 
prescription, the court held that the prescription was interrupted and began 
anew in May 2009 when the state agency created the unit and designated 
the original well as the unit well. Since the alterative unit well started 
producing within a three years from the new prescription period, the 
prescription had been continuously interrupted by the production of 
minerals from the well. For these reasons the court affirmed the trial court’s 
grant of summary judgement in favor of Operator.   
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Marlborough Oil & Gas, L.L.C v. Baker Hughes Oil Field Operations, Inc., 
2018-0557 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/14/18); No. 2018 CA 0557, 2018 WL 
5961770.  
 
Operator perfected an oil well lien on a well owned by Lessee that was 
found to be a dry hole.  The trial court found that the lien had no real legal 
effect, and Operator appealed. The trial court found in favor of Lessee in 
part because the description of the operating interest was deficient—it only 
referenced the particular well and not a description of an operating interest.  
However, the appellate court ruled that Louisiana Revised Statute 
9:4868(A)(5) permits a description including the name and serial or other 
identification of the well and the name of the field where it is located in 
relation to perfecting an oil well lien.  As such, the court reversed the trial 
court in favor of Operator. 
 
North Dakota 
Johnson v. Statoil Oil & Gas LP, 2018 ND 227, 918 N.W.2d 58 (N.D. 
2018). 
 
Petitioner appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Oil 
Company in a dispute over oil and gas leases. The parties’ dispute revolved 
around five out of eight well-heads that were not producing oil in “paying 
quantities” and whether the lease for such wells was finished at the end of 
the three-year lease under Pugh clauses, or extended because of ongoing 
drilling operations elsewhere on the leased property under “the habendum 
and continuous drilling clauses.” The Supreme Court of North Dakota 
first clarified that the Pugh clauses in this case are different from the Pugh 
clause in the case of Egeland v. Continental Resources, Inc., which Oil 
Company relied on. The Pugh clauses in the current case identified “both 
the land subject to an extension and the method of the extension” as 
opposed to the Egeland Pugh clause that only defined the land subject to 
extension. The Court then concluded that the Pugh clauses, which defined 
extension by production quantity of oil, the continuous drilling operations 
clauses, and the habendum clauses, which defined extension by production 
or drilling, were incompatible and could not be “harmonized” as Oil 
Company would like. The Court then concluded that because the Pugh 
clauses were actually added by the parties, as opposed to the other clauses 
which were just part of the forms to begin with, the Pugh clauses should 
govern the method of extension. Since the Pugh clauses governed the 
method of extension as production of oil in “paying quantities,” which the 
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five well-heads were not producing, the Court found that the lease for 
those five wells could not be extended. The Court accordingly reversed 
the judgment of the district court. 
 
Ohio 
Dundics v. Eric Petroleum Corp., 2018-Ohio-3826, No. 2017-0448, 2018 
WL 4627711. 
 
Two oil and gas professionals (“Landmen”) met with a petroleum 
corporation (“Corporation”) to discuss the venture of acquiring oil and gas 
leases. Corporation entered into an agreement by which Landmen would 
find property owners and negotiate leases for exploration and production of 
oil and gas. In exchange, Corporation would compensate Landmen with 
fixed payment for every leased acre and a percentage of the proceeds from 
working wells. Landmen brought an action for damages, breach of contract, 
conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. Corporation 
moved to dismiss because Landmen were not licensed real estate brokers 
and could not bring an action for conducting real estate activities. The issue 
was whether Landmen needed to be licensed real estate brokers to enter into 
oil and gas leases. The Ohio Supreme Court held that an oil and gas lease 
falls within the definition of real estate set forth in Ohio law and the 
negotiation of which requires a real-estate-broker’s license pursuant to Ohio 
law. The Court was aware of the historical role landmen played in Ohio, but 
reasoned that the plain meaning of the statutes clearly expressed the intent 
to include negotiating oil and gas leases within the scope of activities that 
require a real estate broker’s license.  
 
 
Thompson v. Custer, NO. 2017-Ohio-4476, 2018 WL 5794135 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Nov. 5, 2018).   
 
Surface Owner owned the surface on the disputed tract of land, as well as a 
½ undivided interest in the minerals.  Mineral Owner owned a ½ undivided 
interest in the minerals beneath the disputed tract of land.  Both Surface 
Owner and Mineral Owner possessed an undivided right to lease their 
minerals.  Surface Owner leased the entire disputed tract of land to 
Operator.  Operator discovered that ½ of the minerals did not belong to 
Surface Owner, and only paid Surface Owner a bonus proportionate to his 
½ interest in the minerals beneath the disputed tract of land.  Surface Owner 
then filed an Affidavit of Abandonment on Mineral Owner’s interest, and 
Mineral Owner Responded.  Mineral Owner then sought ½ of the bonus 
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payment paid onto Surface Owner. The Court of Appeals of Ohio took the 
case to weigh in on the bonus payment question and abandonment question. 
The court ruled that even though Mineral Owner had responded to the 
Affidavit of Abandonment in time to protect their title, they were not due a 
share of the proceeds from the leases entered into by opposite mineral 
interest owner. The court ruled that an undivided ½ mineral interest owner 
who has an undivided ½ power to lease does not have to pay a 
proportionate share of royalties, or bonuses from the leases he enters into, 
to the other ½ mineral interest owner.  Furthermore, the operator does not 
have to pay ½ of the royalty to the non-leasing mineral interest owner. 
Finally, Surface Owner argued that the lands had been unconstitutionally 
taken from them, but the court quickly dispensed with this issue, as the 
minerals owned by Mineral Owner had never vested in Surface Owner, so 
they could not be unconstitutionally taken away. Mineral Owner was not 
entitled to half of the bonus payment but did retain the title to their 
minerals.   
 
Pennsylvania 
Protect PT v. Penn Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 39-42 C.D. 2018, 2018 
WL 5831186 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 8, 2018). 
 
Objector challenged Zoning Board’s (“Board”) grant of special exceptions 
to Company for oil and gas operations, specifically that: (1) Company’s 
proposal failed to satisfy toxic water storage requirements; (2) the 
proposal failed to protect citizens’ environmental rights; and (3) the 
proposal represented a high probability of danger to the public health and 
safety. The first issue was a question of fact, so the appellate court deferred 
to the fact-finder, Zoning Board. The special exception, by its nature, was 
noted as presumptively operating within the zoning requirements, and the 
record further supported Board’s finding that Company’s proposed 
wastewater storage did not violate ordinance requirements as the storage 
was of “brine” rather than toxic materials. Objector’s second issue 
challenged the sufficiency of Board’s environmental protection measures 
taken in conjunction with granting the special exceptions to Company. The 
appellate court noted that applicants such as Company can, and did, bear 
the burden of evidentiary proof and persuasion, but in this specific context, 
Board considered expert testimony offered by both parties and 
appropriately determined that Company’s studies were more persuasive for 
granting the exception. In addition, Board attached a condition of 
environmental monitoring and protection to the grant. Lastly, Objector 
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argued that substantial evidence existed that the oil and gas operations 
would cause harm to the public health and safety, as well as general 
community interests. The court denied Objector’s claims because adverse 
impacts must be argued in specificity, and Objector’s claims were too 
speculative to overturn Board’s rulings. Many claims, such as concerns 
over noise or air quality, were explicitly discussed by the Board’s 
conditional approval of Company’s exceptions, making Objector’s general 
complaints less credible. Other concerns, such as traffic, required proofs of 
harm (such as accident reports) prior to receiving a court’s consideration. 
Therefore, the court upheld Board’s decision.  
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Texas 
Archer v. Tregellas, No. 17-0093, No. 17-0094, 2018 WL 6005071 (Tex. 
Nov. 16, 2018).   
 
The dispute concered the statute of limitations on a claim for breach of a 
right of first refusal.  A mineral interest was conveyed by Grantor without 
giving Holder, the holder of the right of first refusal, notice of the potential 
conveyance.  The court ruled that a right of first refusal is breached when 
the property is conveyed to a third party without giving notice to the right 
holder.  However, the discovery rule applies, and the statute of limitations 
on the claim only runs once the right holder knows, or should know, of the 
breach.  The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that Grantor breached Holder’s 
Right of First Refusal by not giving Holder notice of the potential 
conveyance.    
 
CCI Gulf Coast Upstream, LLC v. Circle X Camp Cooley, LTD, No. 10-17-
00325-CV, 2018 WL 4624012 (Tex. App. Sept. 26, 2018). 
 
Lessor sued Lessee, asserting that Lessee violated the lease agreement by 
denying Lessor free use of gas produced on the property. The trial court 
found in favor of Lessor, and Lessee appealed, arguing that: (1) the free-gas 
clause in the lease was indefinite and therefore violated the statute of 
frauds; and (2) that enforcement of the free-gas clause would implicate 
public health and safety concerns due to the level of hydrogen sulfide 
contained in the gas. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, 
rejecting both of Lessee’s arguments, instead holding that: (1) the lease 
language allowing Lessor to use gas free of charge “out of any gas not 
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needed for operations hereunder” for “lands in the vicinity owned by the 
lessor” was quantifiable and determinable; and (2) Lessee did not articulate 
any statute, regulation, opinion, or public policy which would be violated 
by the free-gas clause and thus failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to 
the clause’s enforceability. For these reasons, the court affirmed the trial 
court’s decision.   
 
Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Energen Res. Corp., 563 S.W.3d 449 
(Tex. App. 2018). 
 
Company appealed summary judgment in favor of Corporation regarding 
the judicial interpretation of contractual oil and gas agreements between 
the parties. Specifically, Company objected to an interpretation of unused 
days as it applied to a continuous development program described in the 
contract. The contract allowed Company to retain a leasehold interest after 
the primary term of the lease expired so long as it maintained a continuous 
development program. The appellate court reviewed the summary judgment 
de novo. The court reviewed the lease agreement as a contractual 
relationship, and so afforded the terms of the contract their plain meaning 
and used the terms of the contract to give effect to the intent of the parties. 
The terms stated that Company could accumulate unused days in any 150-
day term to be used in the next. Company asserted it could continue to 
accumulate unused days so long as it continued to drill every 150 days, 
whereas Corporation would limit the accumulation of unused days to the 
immediately preceding well. Applying plain definitional meanings to the 
terms, the court recognized the use of the word “next” within the contract. 
As “next” was defined as “immediately adjacent,” the court accepted 
Corporation’s interpretation. Although Company argued that the 150-day 
limit was merely a “label,” upon which unused days could be added so long 
as they were available, the court recognized the continued use of the phrase 
within the contract as descriptive, and therefore instructive to the 
interpretation. Taken in conjunction with the term “next,” “150-days” was a 
clear limitation agreed to by the parties. The court noted, “[w]hen the terms 
of a contract are plain, definite, and unambiguous, courts must enforce the 
contract as written.” The plain language also supported economic 
development of the land, and therefore the court affirmed the interpretation 
in favor of Corporation.  
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M&M Res., Inc. v. DSTJ, LLP, NO. 09-18-00083-CV, 2018 WL 5986002 
(Tex. App. Nov. 15, 2018).   
 
Assignor brought this action against Assignee. Assignor sued Assignee to 
recover back payments and decide who held rightful title to the mineral 
interests.  The trial court ruled in favor of Assignor and vacated Assignee's 
title to the mineral interests. This dispute addressed the confusion 
surrounding whether claimant is seeking relief related to property interests 
through a trespass-to-try-title action or a suit under the Declaratory 
Judgement Act.  The two actions cannot be brought together.  The appellate 
court affirmed the trial court and ruled that a dispute involving a claim of 
superior title and the determination of possessory interests in the property 
must be brought as a trespass-to-try-title action.  Because the dispute 
involved the ownership of a possessory interest in the mineral estate at 
issue, a trespass-to-try-title action was proper.   
 
Weed v. Frost Bank, No. 04-17-00811-CV, 2018 WL 5927987 (Tex. App. 
Nov. 14, 2018).   
 
The dispute concerns the estate of Husband and Wife and the mineral 
interests therein. Husband has perished, and Descendants brought this 
action to contend that the disputed oil and gas interests were separate 
property from the marital estate.  Bank, as the independent executor of 
Husband's estate, contended that the mineral interests were community 
property of the marital estate as a matter of law. While Husband was 
married to Wife, he entered into a number of oil and gas leases, several of 
which included recitals indicating Husband was entering into the leases 
independent of anyone else—including Wife. However, the appellate court 
sided with Bank, finding that the interests were, in fact, community 
property of the marital estate.  Husband spent time, toil, and effort 
acquiring the oil and gas interests.  Oil and gas was the primary business of 
Husband and Wife.  It was immaterial whether or not Husband spent his 
own separate funds purchasing and leasing the minerals, because, under the 
Texas community property system, any property or rights acquired by one 
of the spouses after marriage by toil, talent, and efforts are assets of the 
community estate—the rationale being that any talent, time, or effort 
expended by a spouse is the asset of the community estate.  As such, the 
court ruled in favor of Bank finding that the oil and gas interests in dispute 
were a part of the community estate.   
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Midstream – Federal 
 
S.D. Illinois 
Nodine v. Plains All Am. Pipeline, L.P., No. 10-CV-163-SMY-DGW, 2018 
WL 4636242 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2018). 
 
Environmentalist filed class action suit against Operator under the Oil 
Pollution Act (“OPA”) and Illinois state law after the rupture of a pipeline 
fitting at a pump station, alleging that it had a defective leak detector 
causing crude oil to leak into a containment dike. Environmentalist also 
alleged that Operator knew erosion caused the leakage up to eight days 
before the spill. Environmentalist contended that 4,000 gallons of crude oil 
contaminated the surrounding area and water sources of the nearby 
communities. In response, Operator filed a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim of recoverable damages under OPA, arguing that the court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction after Environmentalist failed to satisfy the 
mandatory presentment clause of OPA. Environmentalist’s complaint 
included a “sum certain” assessment of the damage to the environment and 
a quantification of socioeconomic damages to the putative class. 
Environmentalist’s claims included damage to 380 residential parcels and 
120 agricultural parcels. Because the court found that the claims were 
sufficiently pleaded for the purposes of an initial complaint, the motion to 
dismiss was denied.  
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS 
 
Federal 
 
6th Cir.  
Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Util. Co., 905 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 
The court in this case answered whether pollution that reaches navigable 
waters by way of groundwater is subject to the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that it is not, however, it is 
the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (“RCRA”) that governs this 
conduct. Conservationists brought suit against Company, alleging that 
Company’s coal ash storage in coal ash ponds led to contamination of a 
nearby lake in violation of the CWA and RCRA. The court made a strong 
delineation between the CWA, which governs water pollution, and the 
RCRA, which governs solid waste. Company combines its excess coal ash 
with water and pumps that wastewater mixture into nearby ponds for 
disposal. The ash ponds were built on karst terrain, which allows for 
groundwater to move more quickly through the earth. Conservationists 
argued that this type of terrain effectively transforms the groundwater into a 
point source, from which the ash solution pollutes nearby navigable waters. 
However, the court determined that the CWA does not apply to 
groundwater, regardless of the type of terrain it travels through to reach 
navigable waters, thus rejecting Conservationists’ “point source” theory and 
“hydrological connection theory.” The court noted that a point source is a 
discrete conveyance, which does not describe the seeping of coal ash into 
groundwater. This lack of directness excluded Company from CWA 
liability. However, the court did note that the RCRA does apply to this case, 
Conservations met the requirements of bringing an RCRA claim, and the 
federal courts should exercise jurisdiction over this claim. 
 
Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 905 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 
2018). 
 
Conservation Organization brought suit against the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (“TVA”), claiming breaches of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) 
regarding the discharge of coal ash pollutants through groundwater 
hydrologically-connected to navigable waters. Additionally, organization 
alleged TVA violated the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(“NPDES”) by violating its permit regarding effluent limitations and 
sanitary sewer outflow provision. TVA engaged in common practice of 
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“sluicing” of coal ash and disposing of the mixture in coal ash ponds, where 
leaks into the groundwater occurred, eventually discharging the mixture 
into the Cumberland River, which is a navigable waterway. The Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed “hydrological connection theory,” 
which argues that the discharge of pollutants from the coal-ash mixture into 
the groundwater constituted a point source consistent with the CWA. The 
court reasoned that the introduction of pollutants into groundwater did not 
fall within the gambit of the CWA. Additionally, the court determined that 
TVA did not violate its NPDES permit, containing removed-substances and 
sanitary-sewer overflow provisions, by discharging the coal-ash mixture, as 
those provisions plainly did not apply to such discharge. As such, the court 
determined that the district court’s injunction was an abuse of discretion 
and reversed, finding no CWA liability for TVA. 
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SELECTED LAND DECISIONS 
 
Federal  
 
Fed. Cl.  
Inter-Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc. v. United States, 140 Fed.Cl. 447 (Fed. 
Cl. 2018). 
 
Council sued Government for breach of trust pursuant to the Arizona-
Florida Land Exchange Act and the American Indian Trust Fund 
Management Reform Act of 1994 (“Acts”). Council claimed that 
Government failed to meet trust obligations under the Acts. The court had 
previously dismissed portions of Council’s initial complaint but addressed 
ongoing district court litigation between Government and a private 
corporation to enforce the sought-after payments, of which the corporation 
was supposed to have paid under the Acts and an agreement with 
Government. Though the corporation paid a settlement to Council, Council 
filed the current complaint, claiming that the payment did not resolve the 
dispute with Government.  The court held that parts of the claim were 
barred by statutes of limitation and other parts of the claim were 
insufficiently pleaded. Further, the court held that Government satisfied its 
obligation of adequate security by suing the private corporation in federal 
district court for more than the Release Level Amount and was not required 
to make up default payments. The court reasoned that because Government 
sued the private corporation to provide sufficient security, it was not liable 
for any deficiencies in annual interest payments.  
 
State  
 
California 
Rozanova v. Uribe, No. H044161, 2018 WL 5000022 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 
16, 2018). 
 
Landowner 1 owns a lot with the portion of the parking lot in dispute, while 
Landowner 2 owns the neighboring lot where the rest of the parking lot is 
located. Landowner 2 filed claims against Landowner 1 claiming (1) 
prescriptive easement, (2) equitable easements, (3) easement by estoppel, 
(4) agreed boundary, and (5) declaratory relief. Landowner 1 asserted 
trespass claims against Landowner 2 and sought injunctive relief. The trial 
court found in favor of Landowner 1. Landowner 2 appealed, and the 
appellate court found no error in any of the trial courts findings, but 
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remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether Landowner 2 
had rights to the portion of the parking lot on their own property. The 
appellate court held that the trial court’s order enjoining Landowner 2 from 
entering into Landowner 1’s land was ambiguous. Thus, the injunction 
could be seen as precluding Landowner 2 from entering it owns lot. The 
appellate court reversed and remanded the order so the trial court could 
ensure that it could not be so construed as precluding Landowner 2 from the 
use of his private road. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Pennsylvania 
Cogan House Twp. v. Lenhart, 197 A.3d 1264 (Pa. Commw. Ct.  2018). 
 
Township alleged that Landowners were improperly modifying drainage 
systems and easements by a road. Landowners brought an injunction, 
claiming that Township made modifications in violation of several laws and 
trespassed. Township had modified roads and drain-ways that affected 
storm water runoff, which triggered duties under the Storm Water 
Management Act (“SWMA”). Such duties included a duty to prevent injury 
from the changes and a duty to submit plans for permits from the State 
Department of Environmental Protection to prevent erosion and sediment 
movement. The court found that Township had violated its duties to submit 
and gain approval of its plans and to mitigate liability to adjacent 
properties. The court also found that Landowners had failed to comply with 
SWMA in the same manner when modifying the road to mitigate the 
changes caused by Township. Finally, the court concluded that the violation 
by Township did not create a liability in quantifiable damage to 
Landowners, and that failure to comply with SWMA did not create a 
liability. As such, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
Frederick v. Allegheny Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 196 A.3d 677 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2018). 
 
Landowners challenged a zoning ordinance that allowed petroleum and 
natural gas operations in all districts. They also challenged Board’s grant of 
a permit for a gas well by Landowners’ farm. Board rejected Landowners’ 
challenges. Landowners sought judicial review of the rejections, and the 
court affirmed the Board’s determination. Landowners subsequently 
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appealed. States have the power to zone and plan under their general police 
powers. Zoning ordinances must balance community interest and the due 
process rights of private property owners. So long as the State’s zoning 
determinations are reasonably related to the public health, safety, morals, 
and general welfare of its population, its decision is constitutional and the 
court will defer. When a Zoning Board makes a finding of fact based on 
substantial evidence, the findings are binding on courts of review. 
Landowners feared that putting a pump on the land would significantly alter 
the land, such that they would not be able to use it for farming purposes 
once the drilling was done. Board found that the disruptive pumping 
Landowners complained of would only occur within a short period of time, 
and after that, the land would return to its current state. Furthermore, Board 
found that such use would benefit the community by allowing other 
property owners to fully utilize their mineral and oil deposits. Also, such 
use would not affect neighboring property owners. Based on these findings 
of fact, the court affirmed the Board’s rejection. 
 
Texas 
In re Wood Grp. PSN Inc., No. 04-18-00418-CV, 2018 WL 4760139 (Tex. 
App. Oct. 3, 2018). 
 
County brought suit against twenty-nine Oilfield Businesses asserting 
claims of negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence. Specifically, 
County claimed that Oilfield Businesses negligently or intentionally used 
the road in a manner that damaged the road when accessing their oil and gas 
leases. Oilfield Businesses asked the court to dismiss the claims against 
them with prejudice as they claimed they could not be held liable for 
ordinary wear and tear of the road and because County failed to point to 
specific instances of damage causing negligence. The court determined the 
key issue was whether Oilfield Businesses owed a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to protect County’s road from injury other than by ordinary 
wear and tear. Critically, the court ruled that County’s allegation that 
Oilfield Businesses used the road in an abnormal manner was conclusory. 
Further, County had not alleged that the road was intended for a specific 
group or that there was any notice that heavy vehicles could not use the 
road. As a result, the court concluded that County’s pleading failed to show 
a basis in law that Oilfield Businesses had anything more than a moral duty 
to not damage the roads.  
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SELECTED ELECTRICITY DECISIONS 
 
Traditional Generation 
 
Utah 
Wasatch Cty. v. Util. Facility Review Bd., 2018 UT App 191, 2018 WL 
4846256 (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2018). 
 
County was forced by Review Board to issue a conditional use permit so 
that a power company could construct transmission towers and lines after 
County tried to refuse the permit and sought, but did not obtain, a stay from 
Review Board. County sought judicial review, but did not seek a stay on the 
issuing of the permit, so the permit was issued and the transmission lines 
constructed during the judicial review proceedings. The appellate court 
found the entire appeal moot, because County failed to obtain a stay from 
this court regarding the construction of the towers and the towers had 
already been fully built by the time of the judicial process. The completed 
construction and failure to seek and obtain a stay, under prior Utah case 
law, rendered the case moot. Additionally, the court found that County’s 
sought remedy, “revocation of the conditional use permit,” was unavailable, 
because the permit had not been obtained through “mistake of fact, 
misrepresentation, or fraud” as prohibited in the county code. Thus, the 
county code was inapplicable and the remedy made unavailable. As 
such, the court dismissed the case as moot.  
 
Renewable Generation 
 
North Carolina 
In re De Luca, 817 S.E.2d 919 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). 
 
De Luca appealed a North Carolina Utilities Commission decision, which 
declared that Energy Company was not a public utility and thus not under 
the Commission’s jurisdiction in its dealings with another company. The 
court reviewed the Commission’s decision de novo. The court found that 
Energy Company was not a public utility for two reasons. First, the 
court determined that Energy Company did not sell energy to the public, 
as required by statute to qualify as a public utility, because it only produces 
energy for sale to another company, which then sells that energy to the 
public. The court also decided that just because the subsequent company 
sells the energy to the public and qualifies as a public utility, this does not 
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make the electricity production company a public utility. Second, the court 
found that Energy Company’s production of electricity did not create 
competition in the marketplace of public electricity sales and thus kept with 
North Carolina’s established regional monopolies for the sale of electricity 
to keep the sales well-regulated. As such, appellate court affirmed the 
Utilities Commission’s decision.  
 
Rate – Federal  
 
W.D. Pennsylvania 
Brown v. Agway Energy Servs., LLC, 328 F. Supp. 3d 464 (W.D. Pa. 2018).   
 
Customer sued Electric Generation Supplier (“EGS”), a seller of electricity, 
in a class action for breach of contract. Customer alleged that EGS 
improperly priced electricity in terms of rates. EGS purchased energy from 
energy production companies and sold energy to consumers. The court 
applied three elements to determine whether or not there was a valid breach 
of contract claim: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) a breach of duty 
imposed by the contract; and (3) damages. The court held that there was no 
breach of duty pursuant to EGS’s pricing for electricity. The court reasoned 
that because the consumer contract included discretion and varying factors 
in calculation of rates, Customer had failed to state a claim for breach of 
contract. The court dismissed the case with prejudice.  
 
This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher 
court as of publication. 
 
Rate – State 
 
Nebraska 
City of Sidney v. Mun. Energy Agency, 917 N.W. 2d 826 (Neb. 2018).      
 
Agency sued Energy Provider over monthly transmission rate charges. An 
arbitration board ruled that Energy Provider breached the agreed upon 
service schedule. The board opined that Energy Provider “unnecessarily 
and unilaterally” changed transmission paths. The board ruled that the 
transmission rate was excessive, unfair, and unreasonable. Energy Provider 
brought the current action for review of the board’s decision.  The Supreme 
Court of Nebraska ruled that the increased rate was not arbitrary. The Court 
further opined that the increase was necessary for the continued operation 
of Energy Provider. The Court reasoned that the increase complied with the 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
692 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
agreed upon service schedule and was therefore permitted. As such, the 
Court reversed the decision of the arbitration board.            
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS 
 
Bankruptcy 
 
Bankr. D. Delaware 
Green Field Energy Servs., Inc. v. Moreno, No. 13-12783(KG), 2018 WL 
4629302 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 27, 2018). 
 
Debtor’s estate Trustee sued Special Purpose Entities (“SPEs”) for breach 
of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. Trustee sought to avoid transfers 
made in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. Debtor was an oil service 
business that engineered the use of frac pressure pumps powered by aero-
derivative turbine engines. During a decline in demand for frac services, 
Debtor sought alternative sources of capital from the SPEs. Debtor filed for 
bankruptcy in 2013. The court held that Trustee could not recover from the 
SPEs manager for the preferential transfers as an “entity for whose benefit 
the transfers were made.” The court reasoned that because Trustee could 
not demonstrate that the manager had access to the transfers Trustee had not 
met the burden of proof and could not recover any portions of the transfers 
from the manager.   
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SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 
 
Federal 
 
3d Cir.  
Giovanni v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 906 F.3d 94 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 
Landowners sued Department of the Navy (“Navy”) for an array of health 
monitoring services after it was discovered that dangerous chemicals from 
Navy’s facilities had entered the water supply. The chemicals in question 
have been shown to increase the risk of testicular, kidney, and thyroid 
cancers. Navy asserted a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under a 
provision of CERCLA. The provision in question, as interpreted by the 
district court, would prevent state or federal courts from exercising personal 
jurisdiction because it would interfere with the current cleanup of the area. 
The appellate court engaged in the statutory interpretation of CERCLA in 
order to determine whether the district court correctly decided that these 
claims were barred by CERCLA. The appellate court determined that 
certain claims met the definition of “challenges” to the cleanup and would 
be barred by CERCLA, but that others—like the cost of private party 
medical monitoring—were not. The court clarified that the types of 
“challenges” that lack subject matter jurisdiction under the law are those: 
(1) which delay or interfere with a cleanup; (2) which question the cleanup 
plan; or (3) where the relief requested interferes with the cleanup. 
 
5th Cir.  
United States v. Nature’s Way Marine, L.L.C., 904 F.3d 416 (5th Cir. 
2018).  
 
United States (“Government”) brought action against Tugboat Owner 
(“Owner”) seeking to recover the cost of money spent by various agencies 
to clean up an oil spill on the Mississippi River. The spill occurred when 
two oil-carrying barges moved by Owner collided with a bridge. Owner 
spent $2.99 million on clean-up, and various government agencies spent an 
addition $792,000. Government initiated litigation to recover the $792,000 
spent on clean-up from Owner. Owner claimed it was not liable and 
counterclaimed that the National Pollution Funds Center (“NPFC”) violated 
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) “by deeming it to be an 
‘operator’ of the barge and consequently ineligible for reimbursement of the 
$2.13 million-plus’ that Owner spent on clean up.” Government moved for, 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss5/4
2018]        Recent Case Decisions 695 
  
 
and the trial court granted, partial summary judgement finding only that the 
NPFC did not violate the APA by declaring owner an “operator” of the 
barge and denying reimbursement of clean-up costs. Owner appealed and 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court held that 
the statutory interpretation of the word “operator” under the OPA would 
“include someone who directs, manages, or conducts the affairs of the 
vessel.” It then follows that “operating” a vessel under the OPA would 
include piloting or moving the vessel. This definition is based on the 
Supreme Court’s analysis of the word “operator” in a similar statute. 
Because Owner navigated the barge through the river requiring a great 
degree of discretion and judgment, it would be a strain beyond the ordinary 
meaning of the word to say Owner was not “operating” the barge at the 
time of collision.  
 
10th Cir.  
Audubon Soc’y of Greater Denver v. U.S. Army of Corps of Eng’rs, 908 
F.3d 593 (10th Cir. 2018).  
  
Organization filed petition for judicial review of approval of U.S. Army of 
Corps of Engineers’ (“Engineers”) project to store more water in reservoir. 
Organization argued that approval of the project did not comply with the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”). The petition was denied, and Organization appealed. NEPA 
required Engineers to include an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) 
“in every recommendation or report on proposals for . . . major Federal 
actions.” An EIS must “inform decision-makers and the public of the 
reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts.” 
Organization argued Engineers failed to do so. In choosing to store more 
water in the reservoir, Engineers initially proposed thirty-eight alternatives, 
which they narrowed down to the four options that best addressed the 
purpose, cost, and impacts of the project. Engineers chose the third option, 
deciding it best minimized costs and met the needs of the project. 
Organization argues that Engineers dismissed the three other options 
without sufficient explanation, and suggested even more alternatives. The 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Engineers’ decision to not 
analyze these options was not “arbitrary or capricious.” The court noted 
found that Engineers appropriately explained why they disregarded other 
alternatives, finding them unviable. Further, under CWA, Organization 
argued that Engineers did not appropriately analyze alternatives to 
permitting discharge of materials. The court found that, because the scope 
of the analysis was ambiguous, the court should defer to agency expertise. 
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The court also found that Engineers’ interpretation was not plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. As such, the court affirmed 
the district court’s decision.  
 
D.C. Cir.  
Angelex, Ltd. v. United States, 907 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2018).  
 
Shipowner brought action against Coast Guard for allegedly unreasonably 
detaining its vessel for six months pending criminal trial pursuant to the Act 
to Prevent Pollution from Ships (“Act”). In accordance with the Act, Coast 
Guard requires that ships maintain a record book of discharges into the sea, 
and violation of this provision constitutes a felony. When Coast Guard 
agents inspected the ship, one of the crew members passed a note saying 
that the operator was using a special pipe to discharge oil and other 
contaminants without logging them. Coast Guard deemed this to be 
reasonable cause to believe a violation was committed and revoked 
clearance required to leave an American port pursuant to the Act. Further, 
Coast Guard and Shipowner entered into negotiations to set bond to allow 
the ship to leave pending trial. Coast Guard demanded $2.5 million for 
bond, with additional non-monetary conditions, which Shipowner refused. 
Because the maximum fine in this situation was $3 million, the court 
determined the bond amount to be reasonable. Further, the court stated that 
since the Coast Guard was explicitly given the power to detain the ship with 
reasonable cause, and the Ship Owner was indicted, the Coast Guard did 
not act unreasonably in detaining the ship. As such, the court affirmed 
summary judgment for the Coast Guard.  
 
D. Colorado 
Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Civ. No. 1:16-cv-
01822-LTB, 2018 WL 5043909 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2018).  
 
Non-profit challenged U.S. Bureau of Land Management’s (“Bureau”) 
Resource Management Plan (“RMP”) regarding land in the Colorado River 
Valley. Non-profit used the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to bring 
suit against Bureau, as the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) 
does not provide for a private cause of action. Non-profit alleged the 
Bureau’s RMP violated the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
because, according to non-profit, it had failed to closely examine the 
impacts to the people and environment and consider a reasonable range of 
alternatives. Specifically, Non-profit claimed Bureau failed in its RMP to 
adequately review the severity and impacts of greenhouse gas emissions, 
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methane emissions, their impact on climate change, and the effects of oil 
and gas on human health. Court determined that Bureau violated NEPA by 
failing to closely scrutinize the indirect effects resulting from the 
combustion of oil and gas in the RMP’s considered land area, due to Bureau 
using energy output estimates in the RMP, but failing to estimate effects of 
those outputs. The district court found Bureau properly conducted a 
meaningful cumulative impact analysis regarding potential impact on 
climate change. The court determined Bureau was not required, as Non-
profit suggested, to perform cost-benefit analysis regarding GHG 
emissions. The court did not find Bureau breached its obligation to examine 
methane potency in its RMP, nor did Bureau improperly use industry 
assumptions regarding emission volume of methane. However, the district 
court did determine that, in failing to consider reasonable alternatives that 
would meaningfully limit oil and gas leasing and development within the 
planning area, BLM violated NEPA. 
 
D. District of Columbia 
Moncrief v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 
Lessee sought summary judgment against the Department of Interior 
(“DOI”) and director of the local Bureau of Land Management (“Director”) 
for violating the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and the Mineral 
Leasing Act (“MLA”). More than thirty years after a federal oil and gas 
lease was suspended from drilling and extracting activities, DOI and 
Director cancelled the lease without giving notice to Lessee. Generally, 
agencies have the power to revisit and rescind their previous decisions, 
including those granting leases, so long as that power is exercised within a 
reasonable amount of time. All agency decisions and actions must be 
reasonable with reasonable explanations. Under the APA, an agency’s 
action is arbitrary and capricious rather than reasonable if: (1) the agency 
relied on factors outside of those Congress intended be considered; (2) the 
agency completely failed to consider an important element of the issue it 
decided on; or (3) the agency offered an explanation for its action or 
decision that is contrary to the evidence available. Reasonableness in light 
of cancelling a lease must include consideration of the Lessee’s reliance 
interests at stake. Furthermore, arbitrary cancellation of a federal lease 
without notice and wrongdoing on Lessee’s behalf violates Lessee’s bona 
fide purchaser rights under the MLA. According to various environmental 
impact statements that Director contributed to over the years, the land the 
lease applied to was appropriate for use; however, Director continued to 
suspend the lease. Eventually, that land was incorporated into a Native 
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American “traditional cultural district.” Lessee requested a hearing with 
DOI, which DOI never responded to. The lease was subsequently cancelled. 
The court granted Lessee’s motion for summary judgment because DI and 
Director’s decision failed to consider Lessee’s reliance interest and because 
they cancelled the lease without providing any notice. 
 
This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the 
higher court as of publication. 
 
E.D. Michigan 
Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep't of State, No. CV-17-29-GF-BMM, 
2018 WL 5840768 (D. Mont. Nov. 8, 2018). 
 
Environmentalists continue to oppose the Keystone Pipeline. This case 
centers on a motion for summary judgment and an alleged violation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Environmentalists offered several 
claims as to how Department violated the APA. The court denied 
Environmentalists’ first contention, claiming that Company’s purpose 
statement was insufficient. Next, the court dismissed the contention that 
Department failed to consider all appropriate alternatives. The court found 
that Department considered all relevant alternatives. The court then refused 
to consider some lesser claims. The court, however, did find that 
Department failed to comply with NEPA and the APA in its failure to fully 
articulate its reasoning in its record of decision. The court remanded the 
issue to Department with instructions for Department to fully explain its 
reasoning in a way that does not contradict itself.  
 
This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the 
higher court as of publication. 
 
E.D. Washington 
All. for the Wild Rockies v. Pena, No. 2:16-CV-294-RMP, 2018 WL 
4760503 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 2, 2018). 
 
Conservationists challenged U.S. Forestry Service’s (“Forestry”) approval 
of a new restoration, logging, and timber sale project. Conservationists 
challenged the validity of the bidding process for the contract, which went 
to a private Third-Party. Third-Party then, per the contract, sub-contracted 
another company to perform an environmental impact assessment of the 
proposed project. Conservationists claimed conflict of interest with regards 
to the contract bidding as well as claiming the environmental analysis and 
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Forestry’s approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious. The district 
court determined that Conservationists lacked standing to sue under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) or the National Environmental 
Policy Act (“NEPA”), due to Conservationist’s lack of injury-in-fact, yet 
continued to rule on the merits of Conservationists’ claims to complete the 
record for review. First, the court determined that the bidding competition 
under the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”) was open and fair, 
and the contract award was proper. The court could find no conflict of 
interest and reasoned that even had there been a conflict of interest, 
Forestry’s oversight of the environmental assessment would have cured 
such defect. The court also found Forestry did not violate NEPA, because a 
proper environmental analysis was carried out. The court found no defect in 
the manner in which sub-contractor performed the environmental analysis, 
particularly with regards to the separation of the project into two different 
geographical areas for analysis. Conservationists could not raise a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding its claims that the environmental assessment 
failed to consider the overall impact of the project on fish-bearing streams 
and furbearing populations. 
 
W.D. Washington 
Coalview Centralia, LLC v. Transalta Centralia Mining LLC, No. C18-
5639 RBL, 2018 WL 5619027 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 2018). 
 
The case arises out of a dispute over the performance of a series of 
agreements related to the reclamation of a coal mine and associated power 
plants. The company that owned the mine (“Mining”) hired a reclamation 
firm (“Reclamation”) to clean up and restore three waste coal slurry 
impoundment sites (“ponds”). The contract specifically at issue in this case 
was the Master Services Agreement (“MSA”). Subsequently, a dispute 
arose concerning the invoices. Mining refused to pay invoices submitted by 
Reclamation, alleging Mining overpaid Reclamation for work completed 
and threatening to terminate the relationship if Reclamation did not refund 
the excess payments. Reclamation sued, claiming Mining breached the 
parties’ agreements, and sought to (1) enjoin Mining from terminating the 
relationship and (2) require Mining to comply with the “continuing to 
diligently perform while the dispute is resolved” aspect of the MSA. The 
trial court granted the temporary restraining order (“TRO”). The court made 
its judgement based on four factors: (1) Reclamation can show a chance of 
success on the merits because, at the very least, there are serious questions 
as to how the merits of Reclamation’s claims would play out and a verdict 
for Mining is not guaranteed; (2) Reclamation can show that the absence of 
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a TRO would result in irreparable harm, namely that Reclamation would 
close and cease to exist; (3) the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of 
Reclamation and in favor of injunction, because if no injunction was 
granted and Reclamation shut down, Mining would have no means for 
recovering the alleged debt owed by Reclamation and Reclamation could 
not recover the alleged unpaid invoices; and (4) the public interest goes to 
granting the TRO because the public interest would not be served by the 
clean-up work stop altogether. For these reasons the trial court granted the 
TRO. 
 
State 
 
California 
High Sierra Rural All. v. Cty. of Plumas, 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2018). 
 
Environmental Group challenged County’s adoption of a city plan update 
and Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) as required under California 
Environmental Quality Act. Environmental Group challenges the EIS and 
County Plan (“CP”) in areas outside of the current planning area. 
Environmental Group alleged that the CP violated the California 
Timberland Productivity Act of 1982 (“Act”) and Government Code 
Section 51104 (“Code”). Environmental Group also argued that the EIS 
was defective because it did not take into account newly allowed clustered 
subdivisions, and that it should be recirculated because County added 
substantial information about the development after the comment period 
had closed. The district court found that the CP did not violate the Act 
because it failed to recite the statutory language in the Code, and because 
that section was sufficient to provide restrictions on structures in timber 
production zones. Additionally, the EIS adequately analyzed reasonably 
foreseeable development within the area. The EIS was thus sufficient 
because the population of the county was decreasing, and development 
outside of the current planning area was unlikely. If there were to be new 
developments, County would undergo additional analysis.  
 
Save Our Heritage Organization v. City of San Diego, 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
231 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). 
 
A heritage organization (“Organization”) had been trying to gain pedestrian 
access to historic portions of an urban park. As part of the longwinded 
litigation, Organization filed a writ of mandamus challenging City’s grant 
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of an environmental impact report (“EIR”) for changes to the project. The 
lower court affirmed City’s approval. Under the California Environmental 
Quality Act (“CEQA”), addendums could be made to EIRs to make 
corrections without creating an entirely new EIR and without making any 
new findings. When changes were made to the park plan to meet current 
City standards, City did not conduct another EIR, but rather, made minor 
adjustments through an addendum within the existing EIR. Organization 
felt that the changes were significant enough to require a new EIR, and that 
City, by not requiring a new EIR, was neglecting an express duty. However, 
the reasons City gave for not requiring a new EIR met the relevant 
standards under CEQA, so no other EIR was conducted. CEQA requires 
that City balance the public environmental consequences with the finality 
and efficiency of the decision. The court determined that Organization did 
not meet its burden in showing that the addendum process was invalid 
because the changes were minor, made pursuant to City codes and green 
initiative standards, and made the park more accessible. Furthermore, the 
addendum process and guidelines were appropriate under federal law and 
were a proper use of the State’s traditional police powers. 
 
Indiana 
Elkhart Foundry & Mach. Co. v. City of Elkhart Redev. Comm'n, 112 
N.E.3d 1123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). 
This case centers on an appeal as to which statute governs the statute of 
limitations for environmental lawsuits in Indiana. City, who won at the trial 
court, contended that a statute relating to environmental legal actions 
governed, as did its ten-year statute of limitations. Company argued that the 
general statutes governing property injuries and its six-year statute of 
limitations governed. The appellate court sided with the trial court, 
affirming that the ten-year environmental legal action statute of limitations 
governed. Through statutory interpretation, the court found that the 
language of the environmental legal action statute is meant to be considered 
the appropriate statute of limitations in this case. The court disregarded 
Company’s argument because the case it cited was filed two years before 
the enactment of the relevant statute. The court then declined to decide 
issues relating to Indiana’s mini-CERCLA. The court then analyzed City’s 
claim of a continuing nuisance resulting from the site’s contamination. The 
court sided with Company, because according to Indiana case law, there 
must be continued activity to constitute a continuing nuisance. The mere 
continued existence of the pollution was insufficient. Therefore, City 
missed the six-year statute of limitations for this cause of action.  
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New York 
Nat. Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Scheuckler, 88 N.Y.S.3d 305 (N.Y. App. 
Div. Nov. 9, 2018).  
 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) granted Company’s 
application to construct a natural gas pipeline. Company then attempted, 
under Eminent Domain Procedure Law, to acquire easements over Owners 
property. Company argued it did not need to have a public hearing or 
finding about eminent domain because FERC’s certificate exempted it. 
Owner argued that because Company had its application denied under the 
Clean Water Act (“CWA”), its certificate was invalid under FERC. The 
lower court granted Company’s petition, which Owners appealed. The 
appellate court found that Company was not exempt from Eminent Domain 
Procedure Law under FERC because the certificate issued to Company was 
“subject to” various conditions. One such condition was that, through the 
CWA, Company must receive a water quality certification, which Company 
failed to do. Because State did not issue Company a water qualification 
certification, Company’s FERC Certificate was made invalid. As such, the 
court reversed, holding that Owners had no exemption and no certificate.  
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